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Abstract—As a result of the International Human Genome Project genetic information is rapidly multi­
plying. To avoid some of the problems regarding the availability and use o f  genetic information, it is 
sometimes suggested to apply the concept of ownership. This article focuses on the clarification of the 
status of genetic material and genetic information, obtained as a result of screening and counseling of 
individual patients. First, some philosophical theories of ownership are examined for a justification of 
the use of the concept of ownership with regard to the human body. Next, arguments with regard to 
ownership of the human body are examined. The results of this analysis are applied to  genetic material 
and genetic information. ©  1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
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INTRODUCTION
The Human Genome Project generates an enor­
mous amount of genetic information. This infor­
mation will increase knowledge of our biological 
functioning, and lead to new opportunities for diag­
nosing, preventing, and treating a variety of human 
diseases. Concern has been expressed regarding the 
responsible use and control of the information and 
possibilities that will flow from our increasing 
knowledge of the human genome, To avoid some of 
the problems regarding the availability of genetic 
information, it is suggested that we employ the con­
cept of ‘‘ownership" (or “property”).
Genetic information is generated on two different 
levels. One level concerns the information that is 
expected to result from the dual process of mapping 
and sequencing the entire human genome. The 
other level concerns the specific information 
obtained as a result of screening and counseling of 
individual patients. Another distinction that seems 
useful is the distinction between genetic material 
and genetic information. It is not immediately clear 
whether the moral status of genetic material is the 
same as the moral status of genetic information.
This article focuses on the clarification of the sta­
tus of genetic material and genetic information, 
obtained as a result of screening and counseling of 
individual patients, through a preliminary philoso­
phical analysis of the relation between the concepts 
of property and human body. Is it possible to con­
struct a line of reasoning from ownership of the 
human body to ownership of its parts when separ­
ated from the body, including genetic material?
♦Author for correspondence.
Next, is it possible to claim ownership of one’s gen­
etic information if one would be considered the 
owner of one’s genetic material?
The possible ownership of the human body 
(parts) will be analysed from two different perspec­
tives. First, leading philosophical theories of owner­
ship will be examined. Second, the relationship 
between the human body (parts) and individual 
characteristics of ownership will be examined.
OWNERSHIP IN MEDICINE AND GENETICS
The growing importance of the moral principle of 
respect for individual autonomy in health care 
ethics is apparently associated with popularity of 
the image of the body as property (Campbell, 
1992). If the individual person is regarded as auton­
omous subject, then the body is his private prop­
erty; the person is the sovereign authority with 
property rights over his or her body. Since auton­
omous individuals own their bodies, they have 
exclusive possession of it and they alone have it at 
their disposal. They can bequeath their body to an 
anatomical institute, donate body parts for trans­
plantation purposes, or sell body materials on a 
commercial market. Bodies and body parts can be 
acquired and manipulated by others, but only fol­
lowing explicit permission from the owners.
Property language in health care ethics is used to 
designate the locus of decision making authority: 
the individual as owner is in control over his own 
body. In view of the increasing medical possibilities 
to invade the human body as well as the potential 
of body parts for research and commercial pur­
poses, it is necessary to protect the individual per­
son against harmful and paternalistic interventions
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with and into his body. At the same time, the con­
cept o f body ownership is morally problematic. The 
distinction between person and body is contrary to 
the existential identity with our bodies and the self­
experience of ourselves as embodied selves.
The concept of ownership is recently introduced 
in ethical debates in medical genetics (Danish 
Council of Ethics, 1994; Pompidou, 1995). The 
major issue here is the question of patentability of 
human genes. The growing commercial potential of 
genes and their nucleotide sequences has led to con­
troversies regarding the possible patenting o f the 
hum an genome (Adler, 1992; Davis, 1993; 
Eisenberg, 1992; Kiley, 1992; Roberts, 1987). 
M aking the hum an genome subject to property 
laws presupposes the relevancy and applicability of 
the ownership concept in this area. The basic ques­
tion is: can anyone “own” the human genome? If 
the answer is positive and the concept of ownership 
considered useful in regard to genes, further ques­
tions have to do  with who precisely is the owner. Is 
it the individual person with a particular genome? 
Are there rightful property claims of the scientist or 
company having identified particular genes or 
nucleotide sequences? Or is the human genome the 
property of hum ankind, “ the common heritage of 
humanity” , as proclaimed in a recent declaration of 
UNESCO (1995)?
In order to  determine the relevancy and possible 
uses of the ownership concept in the area of human 
genetics, we need a conceptual analysis and critical 
examination o f  the theoretical implications of the 
concept.
THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP OR PROPERTY
In this section theories of ownership will be dis­
cussed, but it is not an exhaustive analysis of all 
possible theories of ownership. The purpose of this 
review is to clarify what these theories try to 
explain, to examine whether ownership of the body 
is included in any of the theories, and, if ownership 
of the body is no t included, whether something can 
be said of the status of the human body. The the­
ories outlined include: John Locke’s (he was the 
first philosopher to argue for ownership of the 
body); the argum ent from utility by Bentham; 
K ant’s theory o f ownership, from which he expli­
citly excludes the human body; and the theory of 
Nozick (he elaborates on Locke’s theory, but with­
out imposing restrictions on the use of one’s own 
body).
John Locke's theory o f  ownership
Locke intends to provide a justification for pri­
vate ownership in a situation where there is as yet 
no private ownership of things (especially land). In 
the State of N ature, land and all that is on it is 
common to all men. God has given the land to all 
mankind, but w ith the command to labour, to culti­
vate the land. The problem is how to justify private 
ownership o f  part of the land that is common to 
all. Locke argues that since man has a property in 
his own person he has a property in his own labor. 
By mixing his labor with something (for example, 
by working on the land) he becomes the owner of 
the thing. There are, however, two restrictions. A 
person can only appropriate a piece of land, as long 
as there is “enough and as good” left for others to 
appropriate. The second restriction is the 
“spoilage” limitation. I remain the owner as long as 
there is no spoilage of goods (for example spoilage 
of vegetables, because there is too much for me; or, 
the piece of land is too large for me to be able to 
do all the work) (Locke, 1978). This approach 
seems attractive, but several philosophers have 
shown that the argument fails (Carter, 1989; Day, 
1966; G runebaum , 1987).
Locke’s approach is interesting with regard to 
ownership o f the human genome because he is the 
first philosopher to mention ownership of the 
human body. In The Second Treatise on 
Government there is a famous passage:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common lo 
all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. 
This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of 
his body, and the work o f  his hands, we may say, arc 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the .stale 
that N ature  hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his property (Locke, 1978 §27, 
p .130).
And in the same book:
i
From all which it is evident, that though the things of 
N ature are given in common, man (by being master of 
himseff, and proprietor o f  his own person, and the actions 
or labour o f  it) has still in himself the great foundation of 
property;... (Locke, 1978 §44, p. 158).
Therefore, man is the owner of his person (and 
so of his body), The ownership of the body of the 
person is a precondition to acquire ownership of 
unowned things in the State of Nature. Locke, how­
ever, provides no further arguments for this owner­
ship o f one’s person.
W hat does ownership of the body imply? Can a 
person do anything he wants with himself? No, he 
cannot. According to Locke, suicide and selling 
oneself into slavery are prohibited, because man has 
no power over his own life. M an is also not the ab­
solute owner of himself. Man is the property of 
God, because G od  is the maker of man.
Bentham1 s theory o f  ownership
Jeremy Bentham 's theory of ownership reflects a 
utilitarian foundation of property rights. The start­
ing point for his deliberations is the principle of uti­
lity, Following this principle, every action is judged 
according to the extent in which the action aug­
ments happiness and diminishes pain. This assess­
ment applies to actions of individuals as well as to
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measures of government. Only the measures of gov­
ernment have to promote the happiness of the com­
munity (Bentham, 1970).
Property for Bentham is essentially a creation of 
the law. There are no “natural rights” on which to 
found property rights. The creation of property is 
only justified if it wili enlarge the total sum of hap­
piness in society. The arguments for acknowledging 
property rights is as follows (Macpherson, 1978, pp. 
39-58). The state has the task of promoting general 
happiness. For the promotion of happiness four el­
ements are important: subsistence, abundance, 
equality, and security. Of these four elements secur­
ity is the most important. First, without security 
there will be no subsistence and abundance. People 
have to be sure that they will be able to enjoy the 
fruits of their labour and that others will not force­
fully take their profits away. Otherwise people will 
have no incentive to work. If they do not work» 
they will not be able to ensure subsistence and 
abundance, and as a result happiness will decrease. 
Second, a characteristic of man is that he can derive 
pain and pleasure from the anticipation o f  future 
events. Expectations are important in planning our 
(future) lives. One expectation that is im portant for 
happiness is the security that what is mine will 
remain mine. The acknowledgement of property 
jh ts will serve this goal.
Bentham’s principal point of reference is whether 
an acknowledgement of property rights will enhance 
the total happiness of society. If so, property rights 
should be constructed and created by laws. In his 
treatment of property, ownership of the body is not 
mentioned. Bentham seems to reserve the term 
“property” for things external to the person
(Bentham, 1970, pp. 208-209, 243).
Kant's theory o f  ownership
Immanuel K ant’s theory with regard to owner­
ship starts with the general principle o f law:
“Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s free­
dom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its 
maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.” If 
then my action or my condition generally can coexist with 
the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal 
law, whoever hinders me in it does me wrong; for this hin­
drance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in accord­
ance with a universal law (Kant, 1991, p. 56).
This general principle of law is ultimately derived 
from the supreme principle of morality, the categ­
orical imperative. One formulation o f  the categori­
cal imperative is to always treat humanity, in one’s 
own person, as well as in the person of everyone 
else, as an end in itself, and never as a mere means. 
On “humanity as an end in itself’ is based the 
innate right to freedom for everybody: the freedom 
to act as long as one’s actions are compatible with 
the freedom o f everybody else according to  a gen­
eral law. If private property is to be possible, it
must be in accordance with the general principle o f 
law.
According to Kant, what is rightfully mine is that 
with which I am so connected that the use by 
another person without my consent, would hurt 
(offend) me. But to be able to use something it 
must be in my possession. Something outside of me 
can only be mine if I can be hurt by the uncon­
sented use by another, although this object is not 
yet in my possession (Kant, 1991, p. 68). For this 
to be possible it is necessary to discern a special 
form of possession: intelligible or lawful possession 
(for example, I can be the owner of a weekend cot­
tage, although I am at this moment not in the cot­
tage, but in my house in the city). Kant, therefore, 
has to argue for the rightful (lawful) possession of 
external objects. To say that I am the rightful owner 
of an object is to say that someone else interferes 
with my freedom if he uses the object without my 
consent. The concept of rightful possession is a con­
cept of freedom. To establish the use of the concept 
of rightful possession one has to show that it is pre­
supposed by a moral imperative that is derived 
from the general principle of law. This moral im­
perative is the “Postulate of Practical Reason with 
Regard to Rights” : it is possible for me to have any 
external object of my will as mine (my property).
Kant explains his postulate as follows. An object 
of the will is something I have the physical power 
to use. If it would not rightfully be within my 
power (it would be against the general principle o f  
law) to use the object, then freedom would rob 
itself of its possibility of using the will with regard 
to objects (of the will) by placing these objects out­
side any possible use. And this in a situation that 
the will to use the object is formally not in defiance 
of the general principle of law (i.e., the use of the 
object would be in accord with the freedom of 
every one). The only laws practical reason formu­
lates are formal rules for the use of the will. Reason 
says nothing about the objects of the will. This 
means that an absolute prohibition against the use 
of an object would be a contradiction of external 
freedom with itself. From this reasoning follows the 
a priori assumption of practical reason: every object 
of my will is to be treated as having the objective 
possibility of being mine or yours. That is: every­
thing can be owned. The concept of rightful posses­
sion (without physical possession) is intelligible.
In extending the concept of rightful possession to 
external objects, practical reason formulates a per­
missive law:
This postulate can be called a permissive principle (lex per- 
missiva) of practical reason, which gives us an authoriz­
ation that could not be got from mere concepts of Right 
as such, namely to put all others under an obligation, 
which they would not otherwise have, to refrain from 
using certain objects of our choice because we have been 
the first to take them into our possession. Reason wills 
that this hold as a principle, and it does this as practical
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reason, which extends itself a priori by this postulate of 
reason (Kant, 1991, p. 69).
The only place where this right to an external 
object can be in accord with the freedom of every­
one, and where to my right corresponds a duty of 
others to refrain from using the object, is within
civil society.
In this permissive law the concept of first appro­
priation appears (“ the first to take them into our 
possession"). If every object has the objective possi­
bility to be mine or yours, it must be possible to 
acquire ownership of unowned things (objects that 
are not already in someone’s possession). An object 
of my will cannot become mine by just being an 
object of my will, if the object is already in your 
possession (your property), because that would be 
in defiance of the general principle of law. I cannot 
justifiably tresspass on your freedom. Therefore, 
somewhere there must have been a first acquisition, 
even before the existence of civil society. This first 
acquisition is the acquisition of land. The common 
ownership of the land (the earth) is the precondi­
tion for private ownership to become possible. To 
ensure that others will respect my appropriation, 
however, it is necessary to enter civil society.
In her discussion of Kant’s theory of property, 
Gregor (1988) explains that to say that something is 
mine, is to say that my exclusive use of the “object” 
is in accord with the general principle of law (it is 
in accord with the freedom of everybody else). To 
be able to use an object it must be in my posses­
sion. Therefore, to call something mine is to say 
that my possession of it is rightful. The only innate 
right man has is the right of freedom. In terms of 
the innate right of freedom, it can now be said that
I am in rightful possession of my own person and 
so of the objects I am holding. But this possession 
of one's own person is not legal ownership. 
Discussing the (un)acceptability of organ selling, 
Chadwick (1989) cites Kant saying that man cannot 
dispose over himself because he is not a thing. Man 
is not his own property, because in so far as he is a 
person, he is a subject, who can be owner of things. 
The same expression can be found in The 
Metaphysics o f Morals where at the end of his dis­
cussion of On Property Right Kant remarks that a 
man can be his own master, but cannot be the 
owner of himself (he can not dispose of himself as 
he pleases, because he is accountable to mankind in 
his own person) (Kant, 1991, p. 90).
There are clear restrictions to the way man may 
treat himself. According to Kant the first obligation 
of a person concerning himself is his self-preser­
vation. The opposite to self-preservation is the 
whole or partial destruction of the person. The 
whole destruction (of the person) occurs by com­
mitting suicide; the partial destruction by, for 
example, removing or ruining parts (like organs). 
Suicide is prohibited according to Kant, because by
killing oneself morality itself is destroyed. Changing 
myself by removing an integral part like an organ is 
something like partial suicide (and, so, probably 
would not be allowed) (Kant, 1991, pp. 218-220). 
Finally, in his Eine Vorlesung uber Ethik K ant says 
that a human being is not entitled to sell his limbs 
for money, even if he were offered 10000 thalers for 
a single finger. Otherwise it would be possible to 
buy all the limbs of man (Kant, 1990). According 
to Chadwick (1989), this conclusion is not justified. 
It is not self-evident that if someone has sold one of 
his kidneys, he will also want to sell the other one. 
On the contrary, he will probably be very much 
concerned for his remaining kidney.
Nozick’s theory o f  ownership
For Nozick, people have certain basic (natural) 
rights such as the right not to be harmed in life, 
health and liberty. Part of the right of liberty is the 
right of property. Nozick’s theory of property is an 
“entitlement theory” and he provides the following 
inductive definition of the entitlement theory:
(1) A person who acquires a holding in accord­
ance with the principle of justice in acqui­
sition is entitled to that holding.
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accord­
ance with the principle of justice in transfer, 
from someone else entitled to the holding, is 
entitled to the holding.
(3) No one is entitled to a holding except by 
(repeated) applications of 1 and 2 (Nozick, 
1974, p. 151).
According to this entitlement theory, a distribution 
of property is just if everyone is entitled to his 
property (has come by his property by legitimate 
means). The state has no right to interfere if all the 
acquisitions are just, even if the distribution of 
property among the citizens would be completely 
unequal. The theory has two aspects: there must be 
justice in transfer (I have to acquire my property by 
recognized procedures for acquiring property), and 
there must have been justice of acquisition some­
where in the past (the first appropriation). With 
regard to first appropriation, Nozick follows Locke, 
although with some differences. As for Locke, the 
starting point for the first appropriation is the self­
ownership of the individual. According to Locke, a 
person could become the owner of a piece of land 
by mixing his labor with the land. Nozick seems to 
follow this line of „reasoning, although he does not 
present an argument for the transition of mixing 
labour with an object to entitlement of the object 
(O’Neill, 1981). He does not make clear how first 
appropriation would be possible.
The presupposition of ownership of the body is 
not stated in Nozick’s theory as explicitly as it is in 
Locke’s theory. Nevertheless, what can be said 
about what a person is allowed to do with his 
body, is that a person may choose to do to himself
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what other persons would not be allowed to do to 
him without his consent. Nozick refers to Locke, 
and mentions that according to Locke persons are 
not allowed to do everything they please with them­
selves (e.g., suicide is forbidden). His own position, 
however, holds that a person may do to himself, or 
permit another to do to him, anything (emphasis, 
Nozick), unless he has an obligation to a third party 
to refrain from certain actions (Nozick, 1974, p.58).
The theories discussed so far all try to justify 
property rights to objects external to the human 
person (or body). If  ownership of the body is men­
tioned, the concept functions as a presupposition 
from which property rights in other objects are 
deduced. This suggests that theories of ownership 
of the body are not easily derived from general phi­
losophical theories of property. This conclusion 
seems not to be confined to the presented theories. 
Another example is Rawls’ theory of justice. For 
Rawls, ownership is not based on a natural right, 
but is a result from political and legislative 
decisions within civil society. In his theory of justice 
Rawls seems to argue for a common or collective 
ownership of natural assets or talents. A person’s 
talents are not his private ‘‘property” , and, there­
fore, a person has no right to (all) the income from 
his talents. Each member of the community has a 
right to the income of these talents of an individual 
person (Grunebaum, 1987). According to Kernohan 
(1990), however, this collective ownership is not in 
contradiction with self-ownership, if it is interpreted 
as meaning that a person does not have a right to 
unlimited income from his talents. Collective owner­
ship would be in contradiction with Rawls’ own 
theory, because for Rawls, the most important prin­
ciple of justice is the right of each person to the 
most extensive basic liberty compatible with a simi­
lar liberty for others. This right of liberty includes 
the right to freedom of the person along with the 
right to hold (personal) property.
Even Marxism with its emphasis on collective 
ownership of the means of production does not 
seem to entail a collective ownership (by the state) 
of persons and their bodies. An indication for this 
conclusion is the law on organ transplantations in 
the former German Democratic Republic. Based on 
the principle of mutual assistence, all citizens are 
supposed to be organ donors after their death. 
However, if a person has layed down during his life 
that he does not want his organs to be used for 
organ transplantation, his wish is to be respected, 
because of the legal right of every citizen to respect 
his personality (Konert et al,, 1990).
OWNERSHIP OF THE HUMAN BODY
In present-day literature, the starting point for 
the analysis of the relation between the human 
body and the concept of ownership are the property 
rights that are characteristic for ownership. If a per­
son is the owner of an object, this does not imply 
that he has only one right with regard to the object. 
Ownership is a complex collection of claim rights, 
duties, powers, and immunities. As a paradigm of 
ownership, reference is often made to Honoré’s con­
cept of “ full individual ownership” . Honoré (1961) 
compiled a list of standard incidents of ownership. 
Although the listed incidents are not individually 
necessary conditions for private ownership, they 
may, however, together be sufficient for full individ­
ual ownership. The standard incidents include: (1) 
the right to possess a thing; (2) the right to the 
exclusive use of a thing; (3) the right to manage; (4) 
the right to the income; (5) the right to the capital, 
i.e., the right to alienate (transfer) the object and 
the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the object; 
(6) immunity from expropriation; (7) the power to 
bequeath; (8) the absence of term; (9) the prohibi­
tion of harmful use; (10) liability to execution; and
(I I )  residuary character, This list of incidents can 
be useful as a frame of reference in order to decide 
about different modes o f ownership.
With regard to ownership of the human body, it 
is possible to distinguish between three positions: 
(1) no ownership of the body and its parts, (2) no 
ownership of the body but limited property rights 
with regard to body parts, and (3) full ownership of 
the body and its parts.
(1) No ownership o f  the human body and its parts
One way to acquire insight in the concept of the 
human body is to examine how we talk about our 
own body (Kass, 1985). Sometimes we identify our­
selves with our body (he kicked me), at other times 
we distance ourselves from our body (he kicked my 
leg). The use of the possessive pronoun suggests 
some mode of possession. But does possession here 
amount to ownership? Is my body my property, or 
is it me? The question really is whether some of the 
characteristics of ownership may be coherently 
applied to the body. For example, can I alienate my 
body like I can “alienate” my book? How did I 
acquire “ownership” of my body? I did not labour 
for it, and I did nothing to deserve it. Is it a gift? 
How do I behave toward a gift? Can I dispose of it 
as I please? Looking at and interpreting features of 
our body, we understand that we are of necessity 
embodied beings. Part o f our dignity consists in 
acknowledging our fully embodied existence. We 
are, moreover, not completely autonomous beings, 
we are part of a succession of generations. Many 
came before us, thanks to whom we exist; many 
will come after us. Our embodiment, therefore, is a 
gift to be cherished and respected. According to 
Kass (1985), some of the practices of modern medi­
cine (reproductive technology, cosmetic surgery, 
organ transplantation) do not acknowledge the 
nature and meaning of bodily life, but have as their 
starting point the autonomy of the human person.
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If the body is a gift that should be treated with 
respect, and if we are not completely autonomous 
beings, then selling and buying of organs, for 
example, would not be to recognize our bodily con­
dition (U.S. Congress, 1987).
(2) No full ownership o f the body, but limited prop­
erty rights with regard to body parts
Authors defending this view argue that a person 
is not the full owner of his entire body, and that he, 
therefore, cannot claim a right to sell and destroy 
his body. The body is regarded as an integral part 
of the person, The authors, however, do not 
exclude the possibility of limited property rights 
with regard to body parts, because of a certain 
similarity between body parts and ownable objects.
Harre introduces the concept of “metaphysical 
ownership1' to denote the internal relationship 
between a person and his body (Harre, 1991, 
pp.11-37, H6-141), A condition for being this per­
son is that I am embodied in this body. Because of 
my persistent body I am aware of my individuality 
and identity. This is an important characteristic 
that separates human bodies from things. I am 
because of this body, without this body I would not 
be. Losing some of my private property will not 
have the same effect.
Although a person is intimately related to his 
body as is expressed by the concept of metaphysical 
ownership, is there room for legal ownership of the 
body, or its parts? Legal ownership, according to 
Harre, includes a right to dispose of one’s property 
the way one chooses (if there are no restrictions 
imposed). The right of transfer is one of the rights 
an owner has with regard to his property. This 
right can be restricted, for example, if it concerns 
on object of aesthetic value. The legal right to dis­
mantle or destroy it could be denied. Harre argues 
that the owner’s right to dispose of valuable objects 
and the rights of persons with regard to their bodies 
are sufficiently similar to acknowledge that one has 
legal ownership with regard to some body parts. 
Disposal of body material in so far as it does not 
threaten the integrity of the body should be legally 
permitted. For example, the removal of hair, blood, 
and even one kidney will not threaten the integrity 
of the human body. Harre does not make clear 
whether he would allow the sale of all body ma­
terial that falls under legal ownership, or only the
sale of some body material (thus further restricting 
the legal rights of the owner).
In developing his theory of property, Munzer 
analyzes rights with regard to our bodies (Munzer, 
1990, pp.37-58). His analysis also compares the 
rights we have with regard to things with those we 
have with regard to our bodies. Munzer defines 
“property” as relations between people with respect 
to things. Property is “a bundle of rights” . Do per­
sons own their bodies? Assuming that the legal 
rights acknowledged by U.S. law are justified, then 
people do not own their bodies in the sense of full 
individual ownership, but they may have some lim­
ited property rights over their body parts. To 
specify the rights people have over their bodies, 
Munzer analyzes the elements of the “ bundle of 
body rights” . He distinguishes between personal 
rights and “strong” and “weak” property rights. 
Not all rights a person has with regard to himself 
are property rights, some rights fall under privacy. 
The criterion employed to distinguish between per­
sonal rights and property rights is transferability. 
Personal rights are rights that protect interests or 
choices of a person, other than the choice to trans­
fer. For example, the right of free speech is a right 
that a person has and can waive, but he cannot 
transfer it to someone else. Property rights are body 
rights that protect the choice to transfer. If a person 
is only permitted to donate some body material, 
then he has a “weak” property right with regard to 
this body material. “ Strong” property rights involve 
the transfer of body material in exchange for 
money.
According to Campbell ( l992), three elements of 
the “property paradigm” can be found in the litera­
ture on biomedical ethics. First, a right of territorial 
integrity: people have a right of bodily integrity, 
because they are and possess their bodies. 
Physicians are not permitted to operate on patients 
without their informed consent. Second, develop­
ments in modern medicine have made it possible to 
separate a whole range of “parts” from the body. 
In addition to hair, urine, blood and sperm, tissues, 
(reproductive) cells and organs are now transfered 
between people. In terms of property: organs can 
be alienated (transferred) and acquired. This raises 
the question of control and legal possession, the 
third element of the property paradigm. If the body 
is property, who is the owner? Who has the right to 
possess (or exclusively control) the body? To assert 
that a person is the owner of his body and its parts 
is to acknowledge his right to control what happens 
to them.
However, the observation that elements of the 
property paradigm can be applied to rights people 
have with regard to their bodies (right to bodily 
integrity) or to procedures taking place within 
medicine (organ transplants), provide no justifica­
tion for the restricted use of the property paradigm 
with regard to the human body. Analysing a reli­
gious conception (stewardship) and a secular con­
ception (self-ownership) of ownership o f the body 
may further clarify this issue. The analysis reveals 
that in both of these conceptions alienation 
(transfer) of body parts is possible. Within some 
religious traditions (Western religious traditions) 
even the sale of some body materials would not be 
morally objectionable. Campbell, however, has 
reservations with regard to allowing a commercial
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market in organs. Safeguards must be established to 
prevent treating the human body as mere property, 
for this would be to deny our embodied existence.
A somewhat different approach is presented by 
Murray (1987). Recognizing the value of the body, 
both for ourselves and for others (organs for trans­
plantation; tissues for research), there are at least 
two ways to view body parts; they may be seen as 
property that can be bought and sold, or they can 
be seen as gifts. Murray argues that at least some 
body parts should not be regarded as private p rop­
erty, but as gifts. According to him, gifts are im­
portant in establishing and maintaining moral 
relationships among people, because gifts create ob­
ligations for donors and recipients. Gifts to stran­
gers (blood or organ donations) are important for 
relationships within society and for respecting 
specific human values. They underscore our interde­
pendence and the value of solidarity and human 
dignity.
This does not mean that all body parts must be 
treated as gifts; as items that can not be bought or 
sold, After all, not all body parts are equally essen­
tial for human life. Murray gives the examples of 
urine, nails, and hair. The sale of these body m a­
terials would hardly threaten human dignity. Other 
body parts, however, should be regarded as gifts, 
due to their importance in sustaining the lives of 
members of the society. For Murray, some body 
material is fully owned (i.e., one has the right to sell 
the material), but other body materials are only 
owned in a limited sense (i.e., one has no right to 
sell them, only to donate them).
(3) Full ownership o f  the body
Some authors recognize legal ownership o f  the 
human body, although restrictions on what a per­
son will be permitted to do with his body are still 
possible. Andrews (1986) maintains that people's 
body parts are their own personal property. The 
reason for this acknowledgement is twofold: (1) the 
fact that in U.S. law the body is sometimes treated 
as property; (2) the “ property approach” is the best 
way to protect the interests of people concerning 
their own body parts. It will enable them to control 
what happens to their body and its parts. 
According to Andrews, there is no reason to prohi­
bit the sale of all body parts, A prohibition is justi­
fied for the donation or sale of non-generative body 
parts, where donation entails the death o f the 
donor. For Andrews, allowing the sale of body 
parts will not necessarily lead to the public’s judge­
ment that human beings are merely commodities. A 
safeguard against this danger is that only persons 
themselves are allowed to treat their body parts as 
property; others do not have the right to treat me 
as property.
Another advocate of one’s full ownership of 
the human body is Engelhardt (1986, pp. 127-134, 
365-366), The fair allocation of scarce health care
resources requires us to know what would be a 
morally justified allocation; to know this it is 
necessary to know who owns what and in what 
way. Engelhardt’s theory o f ownership follows the 
views of Hegel and Locke on the acquisition of 
ownership. For Locke, a person acquires owner­
ship of a thing (land) by mixing his labor with it. 
According to  Hegel, one takes possession of a 
thing by grasping it, forming it, and by marking 
it as one’s own. The classic example of possession 
is one’s “possession of oneself’ (we form and use 
ourselves). How do we acquire ownership of 
things other than ourselves? Partial ownership of 
other persons we acquire by consent, or because 
we are the producers of them (our children). 
Ownership of things we acquire by grasping, 
forming, marking, and laboring on them. By 
these actions we extend our person in the thing 
and thereby bring it within the sphere of mutual 
respect (i.e,, others may not interfere with the 
thing without our consent).
Apart from private ownership, there are two 
other forms of ownership, namely communal own­
ership and general ownership. Communal owner­
ship are the resources that are brought together 
through a free, common endeavour of the members 
of a community. General ownership is the right of 
every person to the rough material of the earth. 
Only the communal resources can be allocated to 
health care projects by common consent. But per­
sons with private property will always have the 
right to use it in the way they see fit. Physicians, for 
example, have the right to sell their services outside 
a national health care system, because they are the 
owners of their talents.
In this theory of ownership a person is the pri­
vate owner of himself and therefore of his body, its 
parts, and his talents, A free individual has the 
right to dispose of his property (and thus himself) 
as he pleases. The state has no right to interfere 
with the transactions of free individuals. A prohibi­
tion on the sale of one’s organs, therefore, would 
not be morally justified. It is not clear whether 
Engelhardt would allow the sale of organs following 
the removal of which would have as a consequence 
the death of the donor. Generally, most persons 
would prefer to prohibit the sale of vital organs, 
like the heart. However, the philosopher John 
Harris (1992, p, 113, 119) does not see why he 
should not be permitted to give, or even sell, his 
heart (and therefore his life) if that is what he 
wants to do, and he fully knows what he is doing.
OWNERSHIP OF GENETIC MATERIAL AND GENETIC
INFORMATION
The positions with regard to ownership of body 
materials presented above have as their main focus 
the possible sale of body materials (for example, 
organs for transplantation). With regard to genetic
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material and genetic inform ation a reason to 
acknowledge ownership is no t so much the possi­
bility o f  selling genetic material and inform ation, 
but the right to prevent others from having access 
to one's genetic material and inform ation.
The status o f genetic material
It is indisputable that the genetic material, avail­
able for research and other purposes, once belonged 
to the body of some person and that this person 
should be granted some control over what happens 
with his genetic material. Reasons for this control 
are the fact that genetic material contains genetic 
information, which is regarded as highly personal, 
and the danger of abuse of the information. The 
question is, however, which rights a person should 
have with regard to his genetic material and 
whether genetic material should be regarded as 
property.
Since genetic material can be regarded as body 
material, it is possible to apply the different con­
cepts of ownership of the body to genetic material. 
Assuming the right of self-ownership of the body, 
genetic material is the property of the person 
from whom the material was taken. The owner is 
free to do with the genetic material what he likes. 
Since genetic material is not a vital organ, there 
seems no need to legally prohibit either donation or 
sale.
Rejecting the right of self-ownership of the whole 
body, but acknowledging limited property rights 
with regard to body parts, a decision must be made 
concerning genetic material. This decision will 
depend on the criterion used to distinguish between 
different forms of body material. If legal ownership 
of body parts is warranted as long as the integrity 
of the body is not in danger, genetic material may 
well fall under legal ownership. Acquiring genetic 
material does not involve complicated and invasive 
procedures. If the distinction between a right to sell 
and a right only to donate body material depends 
on the social value attached to the body material, it 
is necessary to decide whether genetic material has 
an important social value. If the criterion for prop­
erty rights is transferability, property rights would 
be applicable to genetic material. The question is 
then whether the property rights are weak (only a 
right to donate) or strong (a right to sell).
Apart from the acknowledgment of ownership of 
the body or limited property rights with regard to 
body parts, it is also possible to refuse to apply the 
concept of property or property rights to the body 
and its parts. A reason for this position could be, 
for example, that regarding the body and its parts 
as property is a denial of our bodily existence. 
However, even in this case it has to be decided 
which rights a person has or needs to have with 
regard to his genetic material.
Therefore, only if the starting point is the self­
ownership of the individual are the rights of the in­
dividual clear. A person has the right to sell or 
donate his material, whatever he likes. Therefore, a 
person can sell his genetic material to universities or 
industries if they want it for research purposes. 
However, this does not resolve immediately some of 
the ethical problems in individual health care. Does 
a right to sell one’s genetic material also imply a 
right to sell it to one’s relatives should they need 
the information contained in the genetic material (if 
you need it, you can pay for it)? Within the frame­
work of absent property rights or limited property 
rights, it has to be decided what moral and legal 
rights an individual should have with regard to his
genetic material.
The concept of ownership, therefore, is only help­
ful to determine the possible uses of genetic ma­
terial if one takes the position that each individual 
person has full ownership of his or her body, and 
thus of his or her genetic material. But particularly 
this position is problematic, given the characteristics 
of genetic material. Such material is not specific for 
an individual but refers to a pedigree; similar ma­
terial is shared with relatives and genes as physical 
entities are in fact common to all people. In this 
sense, it is problematic to talk of genes as parts of 
an individual person’s body. It is the informative 
content of the gene which is of interest.
The status o f  genetic information
The status of genetic information is less clear. As 
was mentioned, genetic material is regarded as 
special, because it contains genetic information. Is 
there no difference between genetic material and 
genetic information? On the level of scientific 
research there is hardly a distinction between gen­
etic material and genetic information (genetic ma­
terial is genetic information). In the context of 
individual health care, however, genetic information 
is only available once genetic material has been ana­
lysed and the results have been stored in a medical 
file or computer. Genetic information, as it figures 
in ethical and legal debates, is information that is 
available “on paper” . Again, there are reasons to 
grant a person some rights with regard to his gen­
etic information (because it is highly personal infor­
mation and the dangers of stigmatization and 
discrimination). The concept of property, however, 
is more difficult to apply. Genetic information “on 
paper” cannot be regarded as having belonged to 
the body in the same way as genetic material 
belonged to the body. It is, therefore, not clear 
whether it is possible to reason by analogy from 
ownership or limited property rights with regard to 
human body parts to ownership or limited property 
rights with regard to recorded genetic information. 
With regard to information the concept of
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“intellectual property” has been developed. This 
concept is hardly applicable to the person from 
whom the genetic information derived. This person 
did not generate new information, he did not even 
analyse his own genetic information.
ories will do. But specificity will at the same time 
reduce the applicability of the concept in moral 
debates focused on general guidelines and universal 
rules.
Physical vs information-related ownership
The above distinction between genetic material 
and information is particularly important in the 
context of the patent discussion. It is the genetic 
information found in every person that forms the 
primary object of the patent, not the physical 
gene. In order to clarify the debate on ownership 
of genes, the Danish Council of Ethics (1994) has 
introduced a distinction between physical owner­
ship and information-related ownership, The object 
of ownership can be the physical substance of the 
gene or sometimes the cells in which it is 
expressed, or it can be the information contained 
in the structure of the gene. This distinction is 
combined with one that traditionally plays a  role 
in patent discussions, viz. discovery versus inven­
tion. Patenting is considered impossible for the dis­
covery of things that exist in nature, The genome 
is part of the natural order. The mechanisms of 
nature are identified through processes of discov­
ery. No one can have the right to monopolize a 
discovery. Phenomena of nature should therefore 
not be patentable. Things are different for inven­
tions. Invention is human construction o f  new el­
ements; it is the result of human ingenuity. 
Inventive processes therefore can be regarded as 
intellectual property o f scientists or institutes 
(Pompidou, 1995).
The Danish Council o f Ethics (1994) concludes 
from these two distinctions that patenting on n a tu ­
rally occurring human genes should not be per­
mitted. Modified synthetic genes created or 
invented in the laboratory on the other hand can be 
patented. In other words: physical ownership o f  
invented genetic material is possible. Since the pri­
mary object of patenting is information, a similar 
line can be drawn for genetic information. The in­
formation content of D N A  sequences, used as p art 
of a specific method, for the manufacture o f a 
specific product can be patented, whereas the m ore 
comprehensive information available in naturally 
occurring genes can not. However, this argument 
solves only part of the problem. It makes clear 
when ownership o f genetic material as well as gen­
etic information is possible for third parties, such as 
scientists and industries. It leaves open the question 
of ownership o f naturally occurring genes and cor­
responding genetic information. It still has to be 
decided whether genes in natural form are the p ro p ­
erty of individuals, families or humankind. The con­
cept of ownership in general does not allow to 
make a decision here; only specific ownership the­
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to clarify the status of genetic material 
and information we examined whether it would be 
possible to construct a line of reasoning from 
ownership of the human body to ownership of its 
parts, including genetic material, and, next, to 
ownership of genetic information. A presupposi­
tion o f  this argument is that the concept of owner­
ship can be applied to the human body. An 
examination of some theories of property shows 
that it is not easy to derive a justification for the 
use o f  the concept of ownership of the human 
body from these general theories of property: the 
concept of property either is not applied to the 
hum an body or ownership o f  the human body is a 
presupposition to acquire ownership of other 
objects.
A nother approach to the question of ownership 
of the human body is to examine whether the 
characteristics of ownership can be applied to the 
hum an body, instead of trying to find a philoso­
phical foundation for the use of the concept of 
property  itself The survey of the different pos­
itions with regard to ownership of the human 
body shows that the concept of property is easily 
applicable to the human body, although none of 
the conceptions noticed really amounts to full indi­
vidual ownership. For example, people are not leg­
ally permitted to treat each other as things 
(sometimes even with their consent), Nevertheless, 
it is clear that there is a range of possibilities with 
regard to ownership of the body. At one extreme 
there is opposition to ownership of the body and 
its parts, at the other there are advocates for a 
right to sell even one’s vital organs. Between these 
two extremes some argue for limited property 
rights with regard to some body parts. Since gen­
etic material can be regarded as body material this 
also applies to genetic material. Therefore, the fol­
lowing considerations are also valid for genetic 
material. The concept of self-ownership enables us 
to derive a right to decide the fate of one’s body 
and its parts as one pleases. In all other cases, 
where the entire body is n o t regarded as the prop­
erty o f the person, legal rights with regard to 
one’s body parts have to await thorough moral 
deliberation. Only after moral deliberation, it 
should become clear which legal rights an individ­
ual has, and if these legal rights can be classified 
as “ property rights” or fall more properly under 
another rubric.
If ownership of genetic information is to make 
sense it probably has to be defended by arguments
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other than those that refer to ownership or limited
property rights with regard to the body.
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